CAT/C/56/D/591/2014 complainant applied for leave to appeal the Circuit Court’s negative decision before the Federal Court of Australia, but his request was denied on 20 November 2013. On 26 November 2013, the complainant filed a request for ministerial intervention, which was denied on 6 March 2014. On 17 March 2014, the complainant again requested ministerial intervention, which was also denied on an unspecified date. The complaint 3.1 The complainant claims that he will be detained, tortured and killed if deported to Sri Lanka because he is a young man of Tamil ethnicity and is already wanted by the Sri Lankan authorities owing to his history of association with the LTTE. 3.2 In addition, the complainant claims that he will run the same risks if deported to Sri Lanka owing to his status as a failed asylum seeker. He states that, in February 2014, the Australian Department of Immigration inadvertently published on its website the full names, nationalities, locations, arrival dates and boat arrival information of about 10,000 asylum seekers. The complainant submits that that has created a further risk for him, because if the information is accessed by the Sri Lankan Government, he will be further persecuted. State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits 4.1 On 15 September 2014, the State party submitted that article 3 of the Convention provides that States parties have an obligation not to return a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.1 In its views concerning G.R.B. v. Sweden, the Committee confirmed that the obligation under article 3 is directly linked to the definition of torture in article 1 of the Convention.2 The Committee also noted that, under the definition of torture, several elements must exist for an act to constitute torture: the act must cause a person severe pain or suffering, which may be mental or physical; the act must be intentionally inflicted on a person or on a third person for the purposes of obtaining information, extracting a confession, punishment for an act that the person or a third person allegedly committed, intimidation or coercion, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind; and the act must be inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.3 4.2 The State party notes that each case must be assessed on its own facts. Whether conduct amounts to torture will depend on the nature of the alleged act and the obligation of non-refoulement is confined to torture and does not extend to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.4 In this connection, the State party submits that the Committee has retained this distinction in its views. Furthermore, if it is established that the alleged acts would constitute torture, article 3 also requires that there exist “substantial grounds for believing” that the author would be in danger of being subjected to torture. That is, the complainant must be at a “foreseeable, real and personal risk of 1 2 3 4 4 See, for example, communication No. 39/1996, Paez v. Sweden, Views adopted on 28 April 1997, para. 14.5. See communication No. 83/1997, G.R.B. v. Sweden, Views adopted on 15 May 1998, para. 6.5; also the Committee’s general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, para. 1. See G.R.B. v. Sweden, para. 6.5. See the Committee’s general comment No. 1, para. 1.