CAT/C/56/D/591/2014 being subjected to torture”.5 The Committee has also stated that the danger must be “personal and present”.6 In order to show that a State party would be in breach of its nonrefoulement obligations under article 3 of the Convention, an individual must be found to be personally at risk of such treatment should he or she be returned to a country. In addition, the onus of proving that there is “a foreseeable, real and personal risk of being subjected to torture” upon extradition or deportation rests on the complainant . 7 The risk must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory and suspicion . 8 4.3 In the light of the above, the State party submits that the complainant’s claims are inadmissible pursuant to rule 113 (b) of the Committee’s rules of procedure on the grounds that the present claims are manifestly unfounded. The Committee has also stated that it is the responsibility of the complainant to establish a prima facie case that there is a foreseeable, real and personal risk he would be subjected to torture by the Sri Lankan authorities if returned to Sri Lanka.9 In this connection, the State party maintains that the complainant has failed to do so. In the alternative, the State party submits that the complainant’s claims are without merit. 4.4 The State party adds that the complainant’s claims have been thoroughly considered by a number of domestic authorities and review bodies, including the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. Each body specifically considered the claims and determined that the complainant was not at a foreseeable, real or personal risk of torture under article 3 of the Convention if returned to Sri Lanka. In particular, the complainant’s claims were assessed under the complementary protection provisions in subparagraph 36 (2) (aa) of the Migration Act (1958), which contain the State party’s non-refoulement obligations under, inter alia, the Convention. It notes that the complainant has not provided any relevant new evidence in his submissions to the Committee that have not already been considered through those domestic administrative and judicial proceedings. In this regard, the State party refers to the Committee’s general comment No. 1, in which it is stated that the Committee is not an appellate or judicial body and that it gives considerable weight “to findings of fact that are made by the organs of the State party concerned” (para. 9 (a)). The State party therefore requests that the Committee accept that it has thoroughly assessed the complainant’s claims in its domestic proceedings and found that it does not owe the complainant protection obligations under the Convention. In that connection, it submits that it takes its obligations under the Convention seriously and has implemented those obligations in good faith through its domestic migration processes. 4.5 The State party acknowledges that “complete accuracy can seldom be accepted by victims of torture”;10 however, that factor was taken into consideration by the domestic authorities in forming the views on the complainant’s credibility. It notes that in assessing the complainant’s protection visa application, a reasonable margi n of appreciation was given to flaws and inconsistencies in his testimony. 4.6 The State party notes that the complainant’s claims were considered during the protection visa proceedings, as well as in the external merits review by the Refugee Review Tribunal, the judicial review by the Federal Circuit Court, the review of the 5 6 7 8 9 10 See communication No. 203/2002, A.R. v. the Netherlands, decision adopted on 14 November 2003, para. 7.3. Ibid.; see also the Committee’s general comment No. 1, para. 7. See the Committee’s general comment No. 1, para. 7. Ibid., para. 6. Ibid., para. 4; also see G.R.B. v. Sweden. See communication No. 21/1995, Alan v. Sweden, Views adopted on 8 May 1996, para. 11.3. 5