CCPR/C/117/D/2387/2014 the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in January 2014.7 The author has not established, and the country reports do not support,8 his claim that he would be targeted by Al-Shabaab because of his personal profile as a member of a family with a high political profile, as a Western returnee, or as a young, non-extremist Muslim male. Accordingly, the evidence provided by the author does not support the conclusion that the necessary and foreseeable consequence of the deportation would amount to a violation of his rights under articles 6 (1) and 7. Third, the State party submits that it is not the Committee’s role to review the evaluation of facts, evidence and credibility assessments made by domestic authorities. 4.5 The State party considers that the author has not substantiated his allegations under articles 17 and 23 (1), that the decision to remove him was lawful and was adopted after careful deliberation and analysis of his case. The interference with the author’s family life caused by his removal was weighed against the legitimate interest of Canada in preventing the commission of future crimes in the State party, and his deportation was found reasonable and proportionate to the seriousness of the author’s crimes. Therefore, the State party considers the author’s allegations under articles 17 and 23 (1) of the Covenant to be inadmissible pursuant to article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 4.6 As regards the author’s reference to articles 2 (3), 12 (4), 13 and 18 of the Covenant, the State party submits that the author does not set out any allegation, and does not provide any evidence in that regard. It therefore submits that the corresponding claims are manifestly unsubstantiated and inadmissible. 4.7 Regarding the author’s allegation under article 2 (3), the State party considers that it implies a reference to a free-standing right to an effective remedy. The State party refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence, which establishes the accessory character of article 2 (3),9 and therefore submits that the allegation is inadmissible pursuant to article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 4.8 The State party refutes the author’s argument that the exception to the nonrefoulement principle, as provided in section 115 (2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, can be exercised only in circumstances of extreme crisis, where the danger presented by the person leaves the Government with no viable alternative to refoulement, and where the risk to the person falls short of death, torture, or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The State party notes that it is not within the scope of the Committee’s review to consider its refugee protection system in general but to consider only those processes applied to the individual complaint. In that context, it refutes the author’s argument that the assessment of the danger that the individual faces if returned should not be limited to a personalized risk, but that a general risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment faced by the population in general should also be included in the consideration. The State party recalls that according to the Federal Court, while general country conditions are relevant to the inquiry, the author must still show that he would personally be at risk if removed to his country of origin. It also reiterates that persons who are removable on grounds of their serious criminality and constitute a danger to the public, such as the author, have their allegations of personal risk in their country of origin thoroughly considered and assessed at the different stages of the danger opinion process. The author, through his counsel, was given and took the opportunity at each stage to present evidence and make submissions on his personal risk if returned to Somalia. Moreover, the danger opinion issued by the Minister’s delegate assessed humanitarian and compassionate considerations particular to the author’s circumstances. Accordingly, the State party holds 7 8 9 GE.17-03930 See UNHCR, “International protection considerations with regard to people fleeing southern and central Somalia” (Jan. 2014). Available from www.refworld.org/docid/52d7fc5f4.html. See, for example, International Crisis Group, “Security and governance in Somalia: consolidating gains, confronting challenges, and charting the path forward” (8 Oct. 2013), and the United Kingdom, Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), “Country guidance” in the case of MOJ & Others (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC). See communications No. 1887/2009, Peirano Basso v. Uruguay, para. 9.4; No. 1234/2003, P.K. v. Canada, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 20 March 2007, para. 7.6; No. 802/1998, Rogerson v. Australia, Views adopted on 3 April 2002, para. 7.9; and No. 316/1988, C.E.A. v. Finland, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 10 July 1991, para. 6.2. 5