Although it is reflected in UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014) and recalled in OSCE commitments,220 it appears that the rehabilitation and reintegration dimensions of states’ obligations have been largely neglected. Reintegration and rehabilitation efforts should focus explicitly on “disengagement” from terrorism or violence, rather than more amorphous notions of “de-radicalization” that aim to change ideologies or beliefs.221 Rehabilitation and reintegration programmes should seek to ensure that individuals disengage and redirect their futures, which may serve both to reduce any threat they pose, and in some cases, help to convince others to disengage, thereby stemming the flow of recruits. Such initiatives have been launched in a number of states, but often in the context of the criminal justice process. As noted by the UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism, punitive, coercive approaches should not assume primacy when dealing with the potential threats and challenges posed by returnees.222 In stark contrast to the need to support returning FTFs and others involved in FTF-related acts to re-establish themselves in society, approaches such as arbitrary exclusions (prevention from entering the territory of the state) and over-reaching prosecutions run counter to effective rehabilitation and reintegration. The risk of pushing people further into violent extremism has been recognized, but not fully taken into account in practice. As the UNOCT report notes, there is a danger that states “tend to treat all returnees as high risk, thereby radicalizing those who are low threat through unwarranted persecution.”223 Therefore, prison based rehabilitation programmes need to be complemented by non-custodial reintegration. For them to be successful, both need to be firmly embedded within broader strategies outside of the criminal justice field that prevent terrorist radicalization by effectively addressing the grievances and structural conditions in society that are conducive to terrorism.224 Prison-based rehabilitation and non-custodial reintegration must be comprehensive, voluntary, cautious not to reinforce stigmatization and attentive to potential direct or indirect discrimination. They must reflect the gender-specific needs and challenges of “reintegrating women, as well as men, back 220  See, for example, the 2016 OSCE Declaration on strengthening OSCE efforts to prevent and counter terrorism, para. 8, op. cit., note 152, which states: “We call on States to co-operate in efforts to address the threat posed by terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters and returnees, by inter alia developing and implementing, after prosecution, rehabilitation and re-integration strategies.” See also: OSCE Ministerial Council Declaration on VERLT, preamble and para. 19, op. cit., note 152. The need for programmes of disengagement, rehabilitation and counselling is recognized, for example, in the UNSG PVE Action Plan, op. cit., note 206. 221  On the discussion about de-radicalization vs disengagement in custodial settings, see, for example, “Radicalization in detention – the ICRC’s perspective”, ICRC, 11 July 2016, <www.icrc.org/en/document/responding-radicalization-detention-icrc-perspective>; Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons, (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2016), p. 71. See also: J.M. Berger, “Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption”, op. cit., note 32. 222  F. Ní Aoláin, “The UN Security Council, Global Watch Lists, Biometrics and the threat to the rule of law”, op. cit., note 52. 223  UNOCT Report July 2017, p. 5, op. cit., note 27. 224  G. Holmer and A. Shtuni, “Returning Foreign Fighters and the Reintegration Imperative”, p. 12, op. cit., note 94, p. 12. See also: Chairmanship’s Perception Paper on the 2018 OSCE-wide Counter-Terrorism Conference, pp. 7-9 op. cit., note 4. Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” 61