A/HRC/25/60 51. Similarly, Draft Article 16 on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts requires either the knowledge that the assistance is facilitating the wrongful act, or an intention to do so. Some domestic courts have applied a high threshold for State complicity by ruling that knowingly receiving and relying on information obtained by torture did not constitute complicity under international customary or treaty law if there was no direct encouragement of acts of torture. 52. However, responsibility of a State for complicity in torture or other ill-treatment by collecting, sharing or receiving tainted information shall be governed by a different standard, especially because for torture and other ill-treatment there is a clear universal and absolute prohibition of peremptory nature as well as an affirmative obligation to prevent. State responsibility is objective, and it results form a policy or practice of acquiescing in torture in this manner. In addition, the special rules defined by Draft Articles 40 and 41 on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts referring to a “serious breach” of an “obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law” support the argument for a different, lower standard of intent for State complicity in torture. 53. There is State responsibility for complicity in torture when one State gives assistance to another State in the commission of torture or other ill-treatment, or acquiesces in such acts, in the knowledge, - including imputed knowledge -, of the real risk that torture or ill-treatment will take place or has taken place and aids and assists the torturing State in maintaining impunity for the acts of torture or ill-treatment. A State would thus be responsible when it was aware of the risk that the information was obtained by torture or other ill-treatment, or ought to have been aware of the risk and did not take reasonable steps to prevent it.49 Moreover, the Special Rapporteur finds that the assistance provided by States does not have to have a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime of torture itself. Systematic torture 54. Collecting, sharing or receiving information from a country that is known or ought to be known to torture in a widespread or systematic way, is turning a blind eye to what goes on and is tantamount to complicity in torture as it tacitly acknowledges the illegal situation and fails to prevent and discourage the use of torture. Systematic or widespread violations encompass torture as both a State policy and as a practice by public authorities over which a Government has no effective control. Thus, if a State is known to systematically torture detainees or specific categories of detainees, no State may actively collect, share or recognize information it receives from the agency as “lawfully obtained”, nor may it “passively” accept such information. In addition, collecting, sharing or receiving information from a State known or ought to be known to use torture on a wide or systematic way would also trigger State responsibility under Draft Article 41 on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. International Law Commission commentaries specify that the non-recognition obligation contained in Draft Article 41, paragraph 2 also prohibits acts which would imply such recognition. 55. Therefore, the Special Rapporteur finds the receiving States are responsible because their policy and practice serve to maintain the situation of illegality, which constitutes a serious breach of the peremptory norm prohibiting torture and other ill-treatment and is irreconcilable with the obligation erga omnes of States to cooperate in the eradication of torture.50 Even if ultimately not used, and therefore not under scrutiny, the receipt of 49 50 14 A/HRC/10/3, para. 55; A/67/396, para. 48; A/HRC/13/42, para. 39-40; see also See M. Pollard, op. cit., at 356 S. Fulton, op. cit., at 777; A/HRC/10/3, para. 55