tribunal {Consejo de Guerra Verbal), to which the case had been referred for retrial, again acquitted the 11 members of the Pohce Department who had been in­ volved in the police operation. The acquittal was again based on Decree No. 0070 of 1978. 11.8 At no moment could a civil action for damages be instituted in conjunction with the mihtary criminal proceedings. An action for compensation for the per­ sons injured by the pohce operation in the "Contador" district depended first on determining the criminal hability of the accused. The accused having been acquit­ ted, no civil or administrative suit could be filed to obtain compensation. 12.1 In formulating its views, the Human Rights Committee also takes into account the following con­ siderations: 12.2 The Committee notes that Decree No. 0070 of 1978 refers to a situation of disturbed pubhc order in Colombia. The Committee also notes that the Govern­ ment of Colombia in Us note of 18 July 1980 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (reproduced in document CCPR/C/2/Add.4), which was designed to comply with the formal requirements laid down in ar­ ticle 4 (3) of the Covenant, made reference to the ex­ istence of a state of siege in all the national territory since 1976 and to the necessity to adopt extraordinary measures within the framework of the legal régime pro­ vided for in the National Constitution for such situa­ tions. With regard to the rights guaranteed by the Cov­ enant, the Government of Colombia declared that "temporary measures have been adopted that have the effect of limiting the application of article 19, paragraph 2, and article 21 of that Covenant". The Committee observes that the present case is not con­ cerned with article 19 and 21 of the Covenant. It further observes that according to article 4 (2) of the Covenant there are several rights recognized by the Covenant which cannot be derogated from by a State party. These include articles 6 and 7 which have been invoked in the present case. 13.1 without giving them any opportunity to surrender to the police patrol or to offer any explanation of their presence or intentions. There is no evidence that the ac­ tion of the pohce was necessary in their own defence or that of others, or that it was necessary to effect the ar­ rest or prevent the escape of the persons concerned. Moreover, the victims were no more than suspects of the kidnapping which had occurred some days earlier and their killing by the police deprived them of all the pro­ tections of due process of law laid down by the Cove­ nant. In the case of Mrs. Maria Fanny Suárez de Guer­ rero, the forensic report showed that she had been shot several times after she had already died from a heart at­ tack. There can be no reasonable doubt that her death was caused by the pohce patrol. 13.3 For these reasons it is the Committee's view that the action of the police resulting in the death of Mrs. Maria Fanny Suárez de Guerrero was dispropor­ tionate to the requirements of law enforcement in the circumstances of the case and that she was arbitrarily deprived of her hfe contrary to article 6 (1) of the Inter­ national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In­ asmuch as the pohce action was made justifiable as a matter of Colombian law by Legislative Decree No. 0070 of 20 January 1978, the right to life was not adequately protected by the law of Colombia as re­ quired by article 6 (1). 14. It is not necessary to consider further alleged violations, arising from the same facts, of other articles of the Covenant. Any such violations are subsumed under the even more serious violations of article 6. 15. The Committee is accordingly of the view that the State party should take the necessary measures to compensate the husband of Mrs. Maria Fanny Suárez de Guerrero for the death of his wife and to ensure that the right to life is duly protected by amending the law. APPENDIX Article 6 (1) of the Covenant provides: Decree No. 0070 of 20 January 1978 Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. The right enshrined in this article is the supreme right of the human being. It follows that the deprivation of life by the authorities of the State is a matter of the utmost gravUy. This foUows from the article as a whole and in particular is the reason why paragraph 2 of the article lays down that the death penalty may be imposed only for the most serious crimes. The requirements that the right shah be protected by law and that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life mean that the law must strictly control and hmit the circumstances in which a person may be deprived of his life by the authorities of a State. 13.2 In the present case it is evident from the fact that seven persons lost their lives as a resuh of the deliberate action of the police that the deprivation of life was intentional. Moreover, the pohce action was ap­ parently taken without warning to the victims and introducing measures for llie res/oration of public order The President of the Republic of Colombia in the exercise of the authority vested in him by article 121 of the Na­ tional Constitution, and Considering: That, by Decree N o . 2131 of 1976, the public order was declared to be disturbed and a state of siege was proclaimed throughout the na­ tional territory; That the disturbance of the pubUc order has increased with the in­ tensification of organized crime, particularly as a resuh of the com­ mission of offences against individual freedom, against the life and in­ tegrity of the person and against the health and integrity of society; That it is the duty of the Government to take whatever measures are conducive to the restoration of a normal situation; DECREES: Article I. For so long as the public order remains disturbed and the national territory is in a state of siege, article 25 of the Penal Code shall read as follows: 117