HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF IN DUBIO PRO REO & THE STANDARD OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY The in dubio pro reo principle can be traced back to the work Problemata, which is attributed to Aristotle (384 – 322 BC).2 The chapter titled “Problems connected with Justice and Injustice” provides: Further, anyone of us would prefer to pass a sentence acquitting a wrong-doer rather than condemn a guilty one who is innocent, in the case, for example, of a man being accused of enslavement or murder. For we should prefer to acquit either of such persons, though the charges brought against them by their accuser were true, rather than condemn them if they were untrue; for when any doubt is entertained, the less grave error ought to be preferred; it is a serious matter to decide that a slave is free, yet it is much more serious to convict a freeman of being a slave.3 According to a number of scholars the initial formal formulation of in dubio pro reo principle from the Roman time, even though it had not been known under this term4, can be found in a rescript by the emperor Trajan 2 Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128(4) Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1077 (2015). The authorship of Problemata is disputed; the time frame in which it was probably written ranges from the third century BC to the sixth century AD. See Ann Blair, Authorship in the Popular “Problemata Aristotelis”, 4(3) Early Science and Medicine 189-227 (1999). 3 Aristotle, Problemata, Bk. XXIX (emphasis added); translated in E.S. Forster, The Works of Aristotle Vol. VII Problemata 951b (J.A. Smith and W.D. Ross eds., Clarendon Press 1927). 4 In theory there are also different opinions: „For how long the principle in dubio pro reo has been applied is still unclear. The once present belief about its application in the Roman criminal law and criminal reception procedure has with recent works been challenged.“ (Kern, E., und Roxin, C., Strafverfahrensrecht, 14. Auflage, Verlag C.H. Beck, München, 1976, p. 71).