Doubt in Favour of the Defendant, Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt (98-117 AD) addressed to a Adsidius Severus5. A rescript was a document issued by the Roman imperial court in response (in Latin rescriptum literally means written back) to a specific demand made by governors and other officials of the empire. The passage reads: “Sed nec de suspicionibus debere aliquem damnarii divus Traianus Adsidio Severo rescripsit: satius enim esse impunitum delinqui facinus nocentis quam innocentem condemnari” (in case of mere suspicion it is preferable that a culprit should go unpunished, rather than an innocent be convicted).6 This answer given by the emperor was most probably influenced by the humanitarian concepts preached by the Stoic philosophy which was the predominant line of thought during the Golden Age of the Antonines (98 A.D. – 180 A.D), when the Roman Empire reached the peak of its power and civilization, thanks to eighty years of uninterrupted enlightened government. However, as it results from the wording of the rescript, the principle set forth by the emperor was considered applicable only in case of mere suspicion against the defendant, showing therefore that at the time the extent of the principle was rather limited. The reason was that the Roman law had a particular kind of non liquet (non clear) verdict, which was reached when criminal matter remained unresolved and when there was not enough evidence either for a conviction or for acquittal of the accused.7 The consequence of such verdict was a repetition of the evidentiary procedure or its amandment, with the possibility of introducing new evidence, so, consequently such a verdict could be rendered several times in the same court proceeding. Such a verdict did not allow the application of the in dubio pro reo, as the courts, in situations of doubt, did not give preferance to the accused neither would they be inclined to rule in his favour. The non liquet verdict only acknowledged that the guilt or innocence of the accused person was ‘unclear’ and that evidentiary procedure needed to be repeated, which did not benefit the accused in any way. Still, even though the principle of in dubio pro reo was at an initial stage, the juridical ideas underlined in the above mentioned rescript were not isolated. On the contrary, there are several passages in the Digest8 which reflect more or less, the same principle. As such, Juventius Celsus, jurist, gave a similar opinion, as put in the following excerpt of the Digest 5 L. FERRAIOLI, Diritto e ragione: teoria del garantismo penale, Roma-Bari, 1997, p. 643, n. 12, p. 92, n. 25; M.A. DE DOMINICIS, Ancora sulla –formula dubitativa//, in Archivio Penale, 1965, I, pp 535-536. The rescript was reported by Ulpianus, one of the most prominent jurists of the imperial period, who lived between the II and the III century A.D. The quotation is contained in the Digest, also known as the Pandects (from the ancient Greek word pandektes, meaning “all-containing”), a compendium of fragments of works and opinions of the most influent Roman jurists, divided by topics and compiled upon order of the Byzantine emperor Justinian I, in the 6th century, as well as and part of the Corpus Iuris Civilis. 6 Bissacco Cristina, Il canone In dubio pro reo: tra concezione classica e moderna della prova, Padova, 2008, p.11 citing Dig. 48, 12, § 5, Libro septimo de officio proconsulis. 7 Zlatarić, B., Damaška, M., Rečnik krivičnog prava i postupka, Zagreb, 1966, p. 188. 8 See supra n. 5. 16