C O M P A R AT I V E S T U D Y “Benignius leges interpretandae sunt”, thus suggesting an interpretation of the law in a more benign way. Gaius, again a jurist, promoted the same concept and deemed it applicable to any doubtful case, thus considering it a general principle: “Semper in dubiis benigniora praeferenda sunt” (in case of doubt the more lenient solution is to be preferred). And it is again Gaius who, in another part of the Digest, stated: “Favourabiliores rei potius quam actores habentur” (the condition of the defendant is to be favoured rather than that of the plaintiff).9 Аnother segment of the Digest mentioned the opinion on this topic of Ulpianus himself: “In ambiguiis rebus humaniorem sententiam sequi oportet” (in case of ambiguity, it is preferable to go for the more lenient solution). Ulpius Marcellus, a jurist contemporary with Ulpianus, in a segment reported in the Digest, asserted, more or less, the same: “In re dubia benigniorem interpretationem sequi, non minus justus sed est quam tutius” (It is not only fairer, but it is also safer, in case of doubt, to choose the more lenient solution).10 Such line of thought continued also throughout the III century A.D., an age of crises. The jurist Aurelius Hermogeniano, who was active under the emperor Diocletian, wrote: “Interpretatione legum poenae molliendae sunt potius quam asperandae”, suggesting that the interpretation of laws and punishments must make them softer instead of making them harder.11 Furthermore, the Latin historian Ammianus reports on an anecdote which illustrates how deeply the principle was rooted in Roman law. Namely, Numerius, the governor of Narbonensis, a province of the vast Roman Empire, was on trial before the emperor and, contrary to the frequent practice in criminal cases, the trial was public. Numerius defended himself by denying his guilt and since there was not sufficient evidence against him, his adversary, Delphidius, realizing that the failure of the accusation was inevitable, could not restrain himself from exclaiming: “Oh, illustrious Cæsar! If it is sufficient to deny, what hereafter will become of the guilty?” The answer of Emperor Julian was equally famous: “If it suffices to accuse, what will become of the innocent?”12 Bissacco Cristina, Il canone In dubio pro reo: tra concezione classica e moderna della prova, Padova, 2008, p. 12 citing Celsus, 29 digestorum, D. 1.3.18. 10 Paolo Moro, Il diritto come Processo, 2012, p. 204 citing Dig., 34,5,10,1, Ulpianus. See also Sič, M., Trajne vrednosti Rimskog prava (Secter values of Roman Law), Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, year 43, no. 3-4/2006, p. 391; Bayer, V, Jugoslovensko krivicno procesno pravo (Yugoslavian criminal procedural law), Second eddition, Pravo o cinjenicama i njihovim utvrdzivanju u krivicnom postupku (Law on facst and its establishment in the criminal procedure), Second edition, Informer Zagreb 1978, p.37. 11 Bissacco Cristina, Il canone In dubio pro reo: tra concezione classica e moderna della prova, Padova, 2008, p. 12 citing Hermogenianus, 1 ad epitomarum, D. 48.19.42. 12 Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum, L. XVIII, c. 1. 9 17