Article 1. Definition of Torture 47 suffering’ to the definition of torture, and considers that the intensity of pain and suffering necessary to constitute ‘cruel or inhuman treatment’ must therefore be something substantially less ‘severe’.115 Consequently, the Committee partly has confirmed in its invidual complaints procedure, but also in its General Comment, that the distinguishing criterion between torture and other forms of ill-​treatment is purpose, but still has not given up its understanding that there is also a difference in the severity of pain or suffering. 78  However, the difference in the severity of pain and suffering the Committee relates to in its General Comment, should instead rather be interpreted in line with the IACHR’s analysis, as meaning that, due to endogenous and exogenous factors (eg duration of torture and other forms of ill-​treatment, age, sex, health, context, etc), the physical and mental consequences of torture and other forms of ill-​treatment can vary in intensity for every person and not in the sense that severity is the distinguishing criterion.116 79  The Human Rights Committee has in the meantime also confirmed purpose as the main distinguishing criterion between torture and other forms of ill-​treatment: as the CCPR does not contain any definition of the concepts covered by Article 7 CCPR and as no legal consequences derive from the precise qualification of a particular practice, the Human Rights Committee has previously stipulated that it does not consider it necessary to draw sharp distinctions between the various prohibited forms of treatment or punishment.117 Yet, in Giri v Nepal, the Human Rights Committee argued after having stated that it follows the UNCAT definition of torture, that its ‘general approach is to consider that the critical distinction between torture on the one hand, and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, on the other, will be the presence or otherwise of a relevant purposive element’.118 80  The legal opinion that torture and other forms of ill-​treatment are to be differentiated by the purpose element and not the level of pain or suffering is also shared by the UNSRT, as well as by academia and practitioners. There is in the meantime growing international consensus ‘to establish a common threshold of ‘severe pain and suffering’ for both torture and cruel or inhuman treatment, and to shift emphasis from the intensity of suffering to its ‘purpose’ and motivation’.119 Especially psychiatrists and traumatologists have pointed to evidence suggesting that torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment are associated with similar levels of mental pain or suffering and that a differentiation between the two based on the level of pain is not reasonable.120   Nigel Rodley and Matt Pollard, ‘Criminalisation of Torture: State Obligations under the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (2006) 2 EHRLR 99. 116   Lysias Fleury et al v Haiti, Series C No 236 (IACtHR, 23 November 2011) para 73. Also see A/​72/​178 (n 99) para 28. 117   HRC, General Comment No 20 on Art 7 (1992), para 4. 118   Giri v Nepal, No 1761/​2008, UN Doc CCPR/​C/​101/​D/​1761/​2008, 27 April 2011, para 7.5. 119   Pau Pérez-​Sales, Psychological Torture: Definition, Evaluation and Measurement (Routledge 2017) 6; A/​ HRC/​13/​39 (n 99) para 60; Nowak, ‘What Practices Constitute Torture?’ (n 96); Nowak, ‘Challenges to the Absolute Nature’ (n 96). 120   See Metin Başoğlu, ‘A Theory-​and Evidence Based Approach to the Definition of Torture’ in M Başoğlu (ed), Torture and its Definition in International Law: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Oxford University Press 2017); Pérez-​Sales (n 119) 6, 221. Pérez-​Sales (n 119) 6, 261, has underlined: ‘The distinction between torture and CIDT on the basis of the amount of pain and physical suffering has no basis’: ‘. . . this definition reflects the reality of contemporary torture (as well as torture in the foreseeable future), in which interrogators use more subtle mechanisms that are not necessarily based on pain or suffering.’ 115 Zach