A/67/396 remains constrained by the obligation on Member States under Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter. 30 23. While none of the judicial rulings to date has directly impugned Council resolutions, 31 their effect has been to render those resolutions effectively unenforceable. If the measures cannot be lawfully implemented at the national and regional levels, then the logic of universal sanctions falls away, raising the spectre that targeted funds could begin migrating towards those jurisdictions that cannot lawfully implement the regime. It is therefore imperative that the Council find a solution that is compatible with the human rights standards binding on Member States. The Council’s powers under the Charter are broad enough to achieve this. 32 When an organ of an international organization acts to fulfil one of its purposes, it is presumed to be acting within its powers. 33 Under Chapter VII, it is for the Council to judge whether measures it is proposing to adopt are consistent with the objectives of the Charter. 34 The Council has explicitly recognized that the domestic and regional legal challenges to the implementation of the sanctions regime threaten its effectiveness. 35 In the opinion of the Special Rapporteur, it inevitably follows that the Council has power under Chapter VII to enhance the effectiveness of the regime by establishing an independent adjudicator at the United Nations level with jurisdiction to review and overturn a designation by the Committee. 36 This would promote international peace and security by strengthening the regime’s enforcement, as well as harmonizing the imperatives in Article 1, paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Charter, as envisaged by the General Assembly (see para. 18), resolving the conflict of international norms currently impeding implementation (see paras. 20-22) and honouring the purposive synthesis outlined in the preamble to resolution 1989 (2011) (see para. 19). It would not entail any impermissible delegation of Chapter VII powers since it would require the adoption by the Council of a resolution in which the Council would voluntarily undertake to abide by the conclusions of an independent adjudicator, and the Council could, at any time, revoke or amend the relevant resolution. Review by an independent adjudicator would not be directed to decisions of the Council, but to those of a subordinate body exercising delegated __________________ 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 10 See A/HRC/16/50, para. 19. See Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), 3 September 2008, para. 287; CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (“Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium”), para. 7.2; Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, Application no. 27021/08, Judgement, 7 July 2011 (Grand Chamber), para. 76; and Nada v. Switzerland, Case No. 10593/08, European Court of Human Rights, 10 September 2012, Concurring Opinion of Judge Malinverni, para. 20. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, IT-94-1-AR72, para. 28. See International Court of Justice, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, para. 2, of the Charter), advisory opinion of 20 July 1962, ICJ Reports 1962, p. 151, p. 168. See European Court of Human Rights, Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway [2007] 45 EHRR SE 85 at para. 148; Her Majesty’s Treasury (Respondent) v. Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (FC) (Appellants) [2010] UKSC 2, [2010] 2 AC 534, para. 11; see also footnote 31. See Security Council resolution 1989 (2010), eleventh preambular paragraph. Indeed, it was the view of the former Special Rapporteur that the absence of independent judicial review rendered the current regime ultra vires the Council’s Chapter VII powers (see A/65//258, para. 57). 12-52254