A/67/396 executive powers. The Special Rapporteur concludes that there is no sustainable vires objection to the establishment of a mechanism of independent judicial review. In the words of the Secretary-General: “The evolution of international law has led to more and more rights being divested directly in the individual. … The time has come to align the law applicable to the United Nations with the developments in international human rights law.” 37 B. Al-Qaida sanctions regime 24. Under resolution 1989 (2011), activities indicating that an individual or entity is “associated with” Al-Qaida include any form of support (financial or otherwise) for the acts or activities of Al-Qaida, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof. 38 This reflects the definitional difficulties inherent in targeting an entity that cannot be categorized as an organization per se, and that has no readily identifiable or coherent command and control structure, and no criteria for membership. 39 The Council has thus signalled an expansive targeting strategy, leaving considerable latitude for judgement by those involved in administering the regime. 40 25. The Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee is comprised of diplomats representing all 15 members of the Security Council, and is assisted by the Monitoring Team established under resolution 1526 (2004). 41 States may nominate any individual or entity they consider to meet the criterion of “association” with Al-Qaida (see para. 4), providing that the nomination is accompanied by a description of the information that forms the basis for the proposed designation (the “statement of case”) along with certain identifying information. 42 The Security Council, in its resolution 1822 (2008), introduced a system for publicly disclosing “narrative summaries” that are intended to notify the listed individual or entity of the reasons for the listing. These summaries are prepared with the assistance of the Monitoring Team, 43 but they may be edited to remove any information the designating State considers sensitive. 44 The summaries appear on the Committee website, and consist __________________ 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 12-52254 A/65/318, para. 94. See Security Council resolution 1989 (2011), para. 4. As the Monitoring Team has pointed out, Al-Qaida “increasingly represents an idea of violent opposition to a whole range of local and global circumstances rather than a coherent group with fixed goals.”; see S/2005/83, annex, para. 9; see also S/2012/600. The Monitoring Group has informed the Special Representative that the designation of groups claiming adherence to Al-Qaida without necessarily having any genuine association is treated by the Committee as a “matter of political judgment”; thus, for example, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram have not been designated “at this time” but may be designated in the future if the Committee judges this to be appropriate. See Security Council resolution 1989 (2011), annex I. See Security Council resolutions 1617 (2005), 1735 (2006), para. 5, 1822 (2008), para. 12 and 1989 (2011), para. 13. Previously, in its resolution 1526 (2004), para. 17, the Security Council had merely encouraged States to include identifying and background information to the greatest extent possible. See Security Council resolution 1989 (2011), annex I, para. (k). By its resolution 1904 (2009), the Security Council introduced a presumption that the full statement of case would be published except for those parts that the designating State identified as confidential. 11