Chapter v  Right to be Presumed Innocent and Privilege against Self-Incrimination 99 5.2 Privilege against self-incrimination Article 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR expressly guarantees that any person charged with a criminal offence is entitled not to be compelled to testify against her/himself. This is often referred to as the privilege against self-incrimination, which is made up of the right to silence along with the entitlement not to be compelled to confess guilt.401 In the context of the ECHR, it is implied from the overarching right to a fair trial in article 6(1) of the ECHR. As stated by the European Court of Human Rights in Saunders v the United Kingdom: “Although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention, the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself, are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6… The right not to incriminate oneself presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused. In this sense, the right is closely linked to the presumption of innocence.” 402 As explained by the European Court, protecting an accused person from improper compulsion by the authorities is aimed at contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice.403 This means that an accused cannot be compelled to give testimony in court (See also 5.2.1). However, the privilege against self-incrimination is restricted to the right to silence and does not prevent the compulsory production of material evidence, such as documents, or blood or other bodily samples (See also 5.2.2). In limited circumstances, a person might be legally compelled to answer questions, so long as safeguards are in place to protect the integrity of the right to silence, such as use immunity (See also 5.2.3). For the right to silence to be effective, great care must be taken as to what inferences might or might not be drawn from the exercise of an accused person of her/his right to silence (See also 5.2.4). The right to silence must be understood as prohibiting any direct or indirect psychological (See also 5.2.5) or physical (See also 5.2.6) coercion by investigating authorities of an accused with a view to obtaining a confession or guilt. 5.2.1 Defendant’s testimony in court The most direct and practical result of the prohibition against compulsion to testify against oneself is that a defendant cannot be called as a witness in the criminal trial against her/ him. The privilege against self-incrimination means that the prosecution must prove its case against an accused person without resorting to “evidence obtained through methods 401 As explained, for example, in the Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper: The Presumption of Innocence, EC Doc COM(2006) 174 final, p. 7. 402 Saunders v the United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 65, para 68. See also: Funke v France [1993] ECHR 7, para 44; John Murray v the United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 3, para 45, Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland [2000] ECHR 684, para 40 and Gäfgen v Germany [2010] ECHR 759, para 168. 403 Saunders v the United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 65, para 68; John Murray v the United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 3, para 45 in fine; Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland [2000] ECHR 684, para 40.