98 Legal Digest of International Fair Trial Rights the right to be presumed innocent and, thereby, constituted a violation of article 14(2) of the ICCPR.396 5.1.6 Affect of stay of proceedings or acquittal If criminal proceedings have been stayed, e.g., due to the expiry of an applicable statute of limitations, a court cannot impose prosecution costs and/or compensation to an alleged victim if the law only allows such costs or compensation to be imposed following a conviction.397 On the other hand, when criminal proceedings are discontinued for procedural reasons, the State has no obligation to indemnify the defendant for any detriment s/he may have suffered. A defendant in such a situation will be unable to seek reimbursement of expenses under subsequent civil proceedings, and the court will be able to justify this refusal on the basis of the existence of “strong suspicions” without breaching the presumption of innocence principle.398 Upon acquittal, it is no longer permissible for a court to rely on suspicions regarding an accused person’s guilt. This principle is lined to the prohibition against double jeopardy (See also 8.4). As stated by the European Court of Human Rights in Sekanina v Austria: “The voicing of suspicions regarding an accused’s innocence is conceivable as long as the conclusion of criminal proceedings has not resulted in a decision on the merits of the accusation. However, it is no longer admissible to rely on such suspicions once an acquittal has become final.” 399 5.1.7 Remedy of violations through judicial proceedings It should be noted that conduct of the State that is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence can be subsequently remedied through the judicial process. In Vargas-Machuca v Peru, for example, the applicant had been dismissed from service in the Peruvian National Police based upon assertions that the applicant claimed had never existed. Ultimately, however, both the Trujillo Third Special Civil Court and the Trujillo First Civil Division found that the applicant had been unlawfully dismissed and reinstated him in his post. Consequently, the Human Rights Committee took the position that there was no violation of due process within the meaning of article 14(1) of the ICCPR, since the domestic court had remedied the breach. It also considered that the domestic courts had recognized the applicant’s innocence and that there was consequently no violation of the right contained article 14(2).400 396 Cagas v the Philippines, HRC Communication 788/1997, UN Doc CCPR/C/73/D/788/1997 (2001), para 7.2. See also UN Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc CCPR/C/ITA/CO/5 (2006), para 14. 397 Minelli v Switzerland [1983] ECHR 4, para 38. 398 Lutz v Germany [1987] ECHR 20, para 63. 399 Sekanina v Austria [1993] ECHR 37, para 30. 400 Vargas-Machuca v Peru, HRC Communication 906/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/75/D/906/2000 (2002), para 7.3. Compare with Arutyuniantz v Uzbekistan, HRC Communication 971/2001, UN Doc CCPR/ C/83/D/971/2001 (2005), para 6.4.