application to re-enter Canada as an immigrant is a viable administrative procedure that does not entail reconsideration of the judicial decision of the Immigration Appeal Board” (see 9.1) See also paragraph 4.2, statements attributable to the State party, including the following “... furthermore, he would not be barred once and for all from re-admission to Canada”. APPENDIX II Individual opinion submitted by Mr.Laurel Francis pursuant to rule 94, paragraph 3, of the Committee’s rules of procedure, concerning the Views of the Committee on communication No 538/1993, Charles Stewart v. Canada Implicit in the foregoing is the admission that the State party recognizes Mr. Stewart's status as a permanent resident in Canada as his “own country”. It is that qualified right applicable to such status which facilitated the decision to expel Mr. Stewart. This opinion is given against the background of my recorded views during the Committee's preliminary consideration of this case quite early in the session when I stated inter alia that (a) Mr. Stewart was an “own country” resident under article 12 of the Covenant and (b) his expulsion under article 13 was not in violation of article 12, paragraph 4. But for the foregoing statement attributable to the State party we could have concluded that the decision taken to expel Mr. Stewart terminated his “own country” status in regard to Canada but in light of such statement the “own country” status remains only suspended at the pleasure of the State party. I will as far as possible avoid a discursive format in relation to the Committee's decision adopted on November 1 with respect to the question whether the expulsion of Mr. Stewart from Canada (under article 13 of the Covenant) violates the State party's obligation under articles 12, paragraph 4, 17 and 23 of the Covenant. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, I am unable to support the decision of the Committee that Mr. Stewart had at no time acquired “own country” status in Canada. I should like to submit that: 1. Firstly, I concur with the reasons given by the Committee at paragraph 12.10 and the decision taken that there was no violation of articles 17 and 23 of the Covenant. APPENDIX III Individual opinion submitted by Ms. Elizabeth Evatt, Ms. Cecilia Medina Quiroga and Mr. Francisco José Aguilar Urbina pursuant to rule 94, paragraph 3, of the Committee’s rules of procedure, concerning the Views of the Committee on communication No 538/1993, Charles Stewart v. Canada 2. But, secondly, I do not agree with the Committee's restricted application of his “own country” concept at the fourth sentence of paragraph 12.3 of the Committee's decision under reference (“That provision speaks of an 'alien lawfully in the territory of a State party' in limiting the rights of States to expel an individual categorized as an 'alien'.”) Does it preclude the expulsion of unlawful aliens? Of course not -falling as they do under another legal regime. I have made this point in order to suggest that the legal significance in relation to “an alien lawfully in the territory of a State party” as appears in the first line of article 13 of the Covenant, is related to the first line of article 12: “everyone lawfully in the territory of a State”, which includes aliens but, it may be borne in mind that in respect of a compatriot of Mr. Stewart lawfully in Canada on a visitor's visa (not being a permanent resident of Canada) he would not normally have acquired “own country” status as Mr. Stewart had, and would be indifferent to the application of article 12, paragraph 4. But Mr. Stewart would certainly be concerned as indeed he has been. 1. We are unable to agree with the Committee's conclusion that the author cannot claim the protection of article 12, paragraph 4. 2. A preliminary issue is whether the arbitrary deportation of a person from his/her own country should be equated with arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter that country, in circumstances where there has as yet been no attempt to enter or re-enter the country. The Committee does not reach a conclusion on this issue; it merely assumes that if article 12, paragraph 4, were to apply to the author, the State would be precluded from deporting him (paragraph 12.2). The effect of the various proceedings taken by Canada, and the orders made, is that the author's right of residence has been taken away and his deportation ordered. He can no longer enter Canada as of right, and the prospects of his ever being able to secure permission to enter for more than a short period, if at all, seem remote. In our view, the right to enter a country is as much a prospective as a present right, and the deprivation of that right can occur, as in the circumstances of this case, whether or not there has been any actual refusal of entry. If a State party is under an obligation to allow entry of a person it is prohibited from deporting that person. In our opinion the author has been deprived of the right to enter Canada, whether he remains in Canada awaiting deportation or whether he has already been deported. 3. Thirdly, were it intended to restrict the application of article 13 to exclude aliens lawfully in the territory of a State party who had acquired “own country” status, such exclusion would have been specifically provided in article 13 itself and not left to the interpretation of the scope of article 12, paragraph 4, which incontestably applies to nationals and other persons contemplated in the Committee's text. 4. In regard to “own country” status in its submission of 24 February 1995 the State party argues that “Mr. Stewart has never acquired an unconditional Emphasis mine (see 9.1) right to remain in Canada as his 'own country'. Moreover his deportation will not operate as an absolute bar to his re-entry to Canada. A humanitarian review in the context of the future 3. The author's communication under article 13 was found inadmissible, and no issue arises for consideration under that provision. The Committee's view is, however, that article 12, paragraph 4 applies only to persons who 58