are nationals, or who, while not nationals in a formal sense are also not aliens within the meaning of article 13 (paragraph 12.3). Two consequences appear to follow from this view. The first one is that the relationship between an individual and a State may be not only that of national or alien (including stateless) but may also fall into a further, undefined, category. We do not think this is supported either by article 12 of the Covenant or by general international law. As a consequence of the Committee's view it would also appear to follow that a person could not claim the protection of both article 13 and 12, paragraph 4. We do not agree. In our view article 13 provides a minimum level of protection in respect of expulsion for any alien, that is any non-national, lawfully in a State. Furthermore, there is nothing in the language of article 13 which suggests that it is intended to be the exclusive source of rights for aliens, or that an alien who is lawfully within the territory of a State may not also claim the protection of article 12, paragraph 4, if he or she can establish that it is his/her own country. Each provision should be given its full meaning. connections of home and family with one or more of the States in question. The words 'his own country' on the face of it invite consideration of such matters as long standing residence, close personal and family ties and intentions to remain (as well as to the absence of such ties elsewhere). Where a person is not a citizen of the country in question, the connections would need to be strong to support a finding that it is his “own country”. Nevertheless our view is that it is open to an alien to show that there are such well established links with a State that he or she is entitled to claim the protection of article 12, paragraph 4. 7. The circumstances relied on by the author to establish that Canada is his own country are that he had lived in Canada for over thirty years, was brought up in Canada from the age of seven, had married and divorced there. His children, mother, handicapped brother continue to reside there. He had no ties with any other country, other than that he was a citizen of the UK; his elder brother had been deported to the UK some years before. The circumstances of his offences are set out in paragraph 2.2; as a result of these offences it is not clear if the author was ever entitled to apply for citizenship. Underlying the connections mentioned is the fact that the author and his family were accepted by Canada as immigrants when he was a child and that he became in practical terms a member of the Canadian community. He knows no other country. In all the circumstances, our view is that the author has established that Canada is his own country. 4. The Committee attempts to identify the further category of individuals who could make use of article 12, paragraph 4, by stating that a person cannot claim that a State is his or her own country, within the meaning of article 12, paragraph 4, unless that person is a national of that State, or has been stripped of his or her nationality, or denied nationality by that State in the circumstances described (paragraph 12.4). The Committee is also of the view that unless unreasonable impediments have been placed in the way of an immigrant acquiring nationality, a person who enters a given State under its immigration laws, and who had the opportunity to acquire its nationality, cannot regard that State as his own country when he has failed to acquire its nationality (paragraph 12.5). 8. Was the deprivation of the author's right to enter Canada arbitrary? In another context, the Committee has taken the view that “arbitrary” means unreasonable in the particular circumstances, or contrary to the aims and objectives of the Covenant (General Comment on article 17). That approach also appears to be appropriate in the context of article 12, paragraph 4. In the case of citizens, there are likely to be few if any situations when deportation would not be considered arbitrary in the sense outlined. In the case of an alien such as the author, deportation could be considered arbitrary if the grounds relied on to deprive him of his right to enter and remain in the country were, in the circumstances, unreasonable, when weighed against the circumstances which make that country his “own country”. 5. In our opinion, the Committee has taken too narrow a view of article 12, paragraph 4, and has not considered the raison d'être of its formulation. Individuals cannot be deprived of the right to enter “their own country” because it is deemed unacceptable to deprive any person of close contact with his family, or his friends or, put in general terms, with the web of relationships that form his or her social environment. This is the reason why this right is set forth in article 12, which addresses individuals lawfully within the territory of a State, not those who have formal links to that State. For the rights set forth in article 12, the existence of a formal link to the State is irrelevant; the Covenant is here concerned with the strong personal and emotional links an individual may have with the territory where he lives and with the social circumstances obtaining in it. This is what article 12, paragraph 4, protects. 9. The grounds relied on by the State party to justify the expulsion of the author are his criminal activities. It must be doubted whether the commission of criminal offences alone could justify the expulsion of a person from his own country, unless the State could show that there are compelling reasons of national security or public order which require such a course. The nature of the offences committed by the author do not lead readily to that conclusion. In any event, Canada can hardly claim that these grounds were compelling in the case of the author when it has in another context argued that the author might well be granted an entry visa for a short period to enable him to visit his family. Furthermore, while the deportation proceedings were not unfair in procedural terms, the issue which arose for determination in those proceedings was whether the author could show reasons against his deportation, not whether there were grounds for taking away his right to enter “his own country”. The onus was put on the author rather than on the State. In these circumstances, we conclude that the 6. The object and purpose of the right set forth in article 12, paragraph 4, are reaffirmed by its wording. Nothing in it or in article 12 generally suggests that its application should be restricted in the manner suggested by the Committee. While a person's 'own country' would certainly include the country of nationality, there are factors other than nationality which may establish close and enduring connections between a person and a country, connections which may be stronger than those of nationality. After all, a person may have several nationalities, and yet have only the slightest or no actual 59