CAT/C/40/D/293/2006 page 12 10.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 on implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, which states that the Committee is to assess whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be in danger of torture if returned to the country in question. The risk of torture need not be highly probable, but it must be personal and present. 10.4 As to the burden of proof, the Committee also recalls its general comment and its jurisprudence, which establishes that the burden is generally upon the complainant to present an arguable case and that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. 10.5 The Committee takes note of the complainants’ arguments, and the evidence provided to substantiate the latter was submitted to different authorities of the State party. In this connection, it also recalls its general comment, which states that considerable weight will be given to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party; however, the Committee is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case. In particular, the Committee must assess the facts and evidence in a given case, once it has been ascertained that the manner in which the evidence was evaluated was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice, and that domestic courts clearly violated their obligations of impartiality.2 In the case under consideration, the evidence before the Committee does not show the examination by the State party of the allegations of the complainant to have been marred by any such irregularities. 10.6 In assessing the risk of torture in the case under consideration, the Committee notes the absence of objective evidence pointing to the existence of risk other than the complainant’s own account. The fact that at no time did the complainant seek the protection of the Mexican authorities, the inaccuracies regarding the identity of the persons who made the threats of which he complains, the time that has elapsed since the complainant left his job at the vehicle pound and the country, and the fact that his wife and daughter do not appear to have been targeted by such threats, do not allow for a finding that the complainants are the subject of persecution by the Mexican authorities and that they would run a foreseeable, real and personal risk of being tortured if they are expelled to their country of origin. 10.7 With regard to the complainant’s argument that the asylum application filed by Mrs. V.V.J. was based mainly on the persecution that he had suffered, the Committee notes that the decision by CISR took account of factors specific to her, including the fact that she was a young woman 2 See the Committee’s decision in case No. 282/2005, S.P.A. v. Canada (para. 7.6). See also, for example, the Committee’s decision in case No. 258/2004, Dadar v. Canada, where it states that while it “gives considerable weight to findings of fact made by the organs of the State party, it has the power of free assessment of the facts arising in the circumstances of each case” (para. 8.8).