between the ODIHR and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in election monitoring. 63 While this activity has only recently been criticized by a few, it is recognized by the large majority of participating States as professional and independent. The European Union, which has adapted the ODIHR’s methodology for its own activities in this field, has repeatedly emphasized that the ODIHR’s credibility has always been a compelling argument for it not to deploy separate EU election observation missions in the OSCE area. 98. Before suggesting ways of strengthening and furthering the ODIHR’s election-related activities, it is appropriate to situate these efforts within the context of the debate among OSCE participating States and to use this opportunity to dispel a number of misperceptions. In recent years, some OSCE participating States have begun to express criticism of the work of the ODIHR regarding election observation, within the Permanent Council and also directly to other participating States. Criticism of OSCE observations began in the context of a cycle of elections in 2003/4 in which election observation missions pointed out serious shortcomings that not only prevented the characterization of electoral activities as a genuine democratic contest but also raised the risk of a possible reversal of democratic achievements in some countries. 99. At times, the discussion has veered off into criticism from a few participating States lacking a factual basis and misrepresenting the extent to which the OSCE is contributing to the formation of what has been termed regional custom.64 The assertion, for instance, that no standards on elections exist in the OSCE contradicts the language adopted by the latest Summit of Heads of State and Government in the OSCE, which contains a specific reference to “clear standards” governing the treatment of individuals on the territory of participating States.65 Similarly, the argument that the OSCE’s commitments are not binding, as they constitute mere declaratory intentions of a political nature, may, if employed with the intention of justifying a material breach of commitments, defeat the purpose and nature of the OSCE as a whole. After all, the norm-setting nature of the OSCE and its commitments has been reconfirmed on frequent occasions, not least in Ministerial Council Decision 17/05, the basis of this report. 100. A large number of comments and questions were posed by participating States and received prior to the finalization of this report; some fail to appreciate certain fundamental aspects of ODIHR election activities and procedures. This chapter will therefore (1) explain what the ODIHR does; (2) elaborate on actions taken by the ODIHR to respond to some concerns; and (3) suggest further action. 63  Maastricht 2003 (Decision No. 5 on Elections), p. 81. 64  See Eric Manton, “The OSCE Human Dimension Process and the Process of Customary International Law Formation”, in OSCE Yearbook 2005 (Vol. 11 ed. IFSH, 2006), pp. 195-214. 65  Istanbul 1999 (Charter for European Security: II. Our Common Foundations) confirms that the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris “and all other OSCE documents” have established “clear standards for participating States’ treatment of each other and of all individuals within their territories” (para 7). 34 Common Responsibility: Commitments and Implementation