B. The ODIHR’s mandate and methodology 101. The ODIHR has a strong mandate to observe elections. It is based on: u The 1990 Copenhagen Document on the Human Dimension, mandating the Office to compile “reports of election observations” among other election-related information; u The 1990 Charter of Paris, which established the Office originally as the Office for Free Elections and tasks the ODIHR with fostering the implementation of electionrelated commitments agreed upon in the Copenhagen Document; u The 1993 Rome Document, which explicitly tasks the ODIHR with carrying out “comprehensive election monitoring”; u The 1994 Budapest Summit Document, which mandates the ODIHR to “play an enhanced role in election monitoring before, during and after elections” and which also contains a mandate to “assess the conditions for the free and independent functioning of the media”, tasks the ODIHR with consulting “all relevant organizations monitoring elections in order to develop a framework for co-ordination in this field” and with devising “a handbook for election monitors and [setting] up a rolling calendar for upcoming elections”; u The 1999 Istanbul Summit, which commits States to invite the ODIHR to observe their elections and “to follow up promptly the ODIHR’s assessment and recommendations”. 102. The ODIHR’s election mandate is to observe a public political and administrative process that involves the entire electorate of a given country. The purpose of this activity is to provide factual information in order to establish the degree of compliance of the election process observed with a set of political commitments contained in the 1990 Copenhagen Document. Notably, these commitments indicate that a genuine election should be viewed as a public political competition between distinct alternatives, taking place in an environment providing equal opportunities for the various competitors. An election is a process rather than a one-day event, and is thus looked at in its entirety. Among other requirements, this process should enable voters to make informed choices between the alternatives offered and should allow for a tabulation of results in an accurate, honest, and timely manner. Conclusions with regard to compliance with the commitments reflect findings about the process and therefore never comment on the political outcome of an election. 103. Once an election process that the ODIHR intends to observe has commenced, the ­ODIHR Code of Conduct related to election observation excludes any form of direct involvement in the process.66 The requirement for non-interference and objectivity excludes providing formal advice, assistance, or conclusive remarks either to the institutions tasked by domestic law with the responsibility to conduct the election or to any other election stakeholders before the voting procedures have been completed. In this way, the ODIHR Code of Conduct prevents any influence on voters’ choices. Since monitoring does not involve any responsibility on the part of the monitors for the actual conduct of the election, election observation should not be perceived as contributing in any way to the legitimacy of the election process or its outcome. Mindful of these sensitivities, the ODIHR avoids providing election66  Also see para. 113 of this report. Common Responsibility: Commitments and Implementation 35