Dismantling the Tools ofreport Oppression INTERPOL 2018 c. A separate quasi-judicial chamber of the CCF, appropriately composed, and with procedures ensuring the equality of arms, reasonable timeframes, binding and reasoned decisions and a right to appeal, should be created to deal with complaints. dark about the arguments being made against their submissions raised doubts about the effectiveness of the CCF as a redress mechanism. c. The absence of reasoning: The decisions of the CCF contained no explanation of the basis on which they were reached, with responses often limited to one short paragraph confirming the outcome of the CCF’s deliberations in generic language. d. The significant delays in the CCF decision-making process: Based on our own casework and the accounts provided by other lawyers who had engaged in the CCF process, it was clear that delays were a common feature. Rachid Mesli, whose case is described in more detail below, waited for almost four years to obtain a decision to delete his Red Notice from the CCF. e. The inability of the CCF to make binding decisions: An indication of the CCF’s lack of independence from INTERPOL’s General Secretariat was its ability only to issue recommendations rather than binding decisions. Its practice of recommending the addition of addenda to INTERPOL alerts,24 rather than their deletion, increased the likelihood that a compromise solution would be adopted rather than the CCF choosing to require an effective remedy. 42. In light of these concerns, we recommended that: a. INTERPOL should conduct a comprehensive review of the operation of the CCF; b. The competence, expertise and procedures of the CCF required improvement in order for it to provide adequate redress for those directly affected by INTERPOL’s activities; and Interpretation of INTERPOL’s Rules 43. On paper, Articles 2 and 3 of INTERPOL’s Constitution help to ensure the organisation’s reputation as a trustworthy facilitator of international cooperation by enshrining its commitment to human rights and its neutrality. While the text of the Constitution and supplementary rules appear satisfactory, Fair Trials has recognised that there are problems, or at least a lack of clarity, in the way these were implemented. i) Article 3: Political neutrality 44. INTERPOL has produced a ‘Repository of Practice’ on Article 3, which explains how INTERPOL interprets and applies its constitutional obligation to remain neutral. The Repository of Practice confirms that Article 3 is interpreted in line with the ‘political offence’ exception in exradition law (see, for example, Article 3(1) of the European Convention on Extradition 1957 (“ECE”) and Article 3(a) of the United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition (“UNMTE”)) which covers ‘pure’ political offences such as treason or espionage and ‘relative’ political offences which relate to ordinary criminal law offences but are political due to their context and the motive for which they were committed. This leads INTERPOL to apply the ‘predominance’ test, developed by, inter alia, the Swiss courts, and according to which an offence acquires political character if it is committed in the context of a struggle for power and if the private harm done is proportionate to the political interest at stake. The ‘predominance test’ Addenda are additional information added to INTERPOL alerts to notify Member States of key facts such as the decision by a Member State to refuse extradition of the person to whom the INTERPOL alert relates. 24 21