narrowed in the 1970s to ensure terrorism and other violent crimes committed with political ends could be the subject of extradition, and INTERPOL narrowed its rule accordingly by two General Assembly resolutions.25 45. There is however no role in INTERPOL’s analysis for the approach set out in the ‘discrimination clause’ found at Article 3(2) of ECE or at Article 3(b) of UNMTE, which provides for the refusal of extradition where there are “substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition for an ordinary offence is made in order to prosecute or punish the person on account of their race, religion, nationality or political opinion, or that the person’s position may be prejudiced for this reason”. While INTERPOL has modernised its approach to a certain extent, taking into consideration factors such as ‘the status of the person’ and ‘the general context of the case’,26 its approach continues to balance the ‘Article 3 aspect’ against the ‘ordinary-law’ aspect evolving from a classic predominance test into something else, which is difficult to determine due to the lack of public guidance. 46. The failure of INTERPOL to embrace the ‘discrimination clause’ approach, which has become commonplace in extradition law practice as the other test has narrowed, has resulted in its decisions being out of step with extradition and asylum courts, producing unsatisfactory outcomes. We have worked on numerous cases in which domestic courts have found the case to be politically-motivated but where INTERPOL maintains the Red Notice or Diffusion nonetheless. The case of Petr Silaev, outlined in detail in Strengthening INTERPOL, illustrates this problem well. Petr was forced into exile from Russia, having helped to organise the Khimki Forest demonstration 47. In order to prevent cases such as Petr’s arising in the future, we recommended that INTERPOL: a. provide detailed information on how it assesses political motivation and the significance it attaches to extradition refusals and asylum grants; b. commission and publish an expert study analysing relevant international extradition and asylum law and its own obligations, pursuant to adopting an approach in line with the current approach adopted by domestic courts; c. adopt a clear rule requiring the deletion of an INTERPOL alert when either (a) a request for extradition based on the proceedings giving rise to the Red Notice/ Diffusion has been rejected on political motivation grounds; or (b) asylum has been granted under the 1951 Convention on the basis of the criminal proceedings giving rise to the Red Notice/Diffusion; and d. adopt a strong presumption in favour of deleting the Red Notice/Diffusion where the extradition refusal or asylum grant INTERPOL, Resolution No. AGN/53/RES/7 ‘Application of Article 3 of the Constitution’ (September 1984), and Resolution AG-2004-RES-18 ‘Interim guidance to the General Secretariat in cases of membership in a terrorist organization’ (October 2004) 26 Rules on the Processing of INTERPOL’s Data, III/IRPD/GA/2011 (2016), (‘RPD’), Article 34(3) Available at: https://www.interpol.int/content/download /13042/90082/version/37/file/OLA%20RPD%20UPDATE-EN-11%2016%20.pdf 25 22 which took place in 2010 and to which the Russian authorities responded with a major crackdown against those involved. Petr was granted asylum in Finland on the basis of the risk of persecution he faced in Russia but he was subsequently arrested in Spain on account of an INTERPOL alert (in this case a Diffusion) circulated through INTERPOL’s databases, following which a Spanish court refused Russia’s request for extradition on the grounds of its political motivation. Petr’s request for deletion of the Diffusion on Article 3 grounds was denied by the CCF in 2013. The Diffusion was only removed in October 2014 after Petr benefitted from a presidential amnesty in Russia.