Dismantling the Tools ofreport Oppression INTERPOL 2018 CJEU found that the redress mechanism provided at the UN level by way of a de-listing procedure ‘[did] not offer the guarantees of judicial protection’, especially because there was no requirement ‘to communicate to the applicant the reasons and evidence justifying his appearance in the list’, and ‘no obligation to give reasons’ for adverse decisions.33 The CJEU viewed disclosure, impartiality, and binding, reasoned decisions as essential elements of the right to a remedy, the absence of which justified the review of the implementing measures at the municipal level. 56. These developments highlight the need for the CCF, as INTERPOL’s redress mechanism, to provide effective remedies, if INTERPOL wishes to safeguard its immunity. The concerns we raised about the CCF’s ineffectiveness, and the risk that this could result in INTERPOL being brought before national courts to face costly litigation, clearly resonated. Secretary General Stock emphasised to the General Assembly in 2015 the need to build a “more robust system” in order to protect INTERPOL from litigation. A review of the CCF’s procedures was the response and the results are discussed in more detail in Section E below. b) Financial Considerations 57. In addition to the threat of costly litigation, INTERPOL also faced the risk of Member States withdrawing financial support if it was unable effectively to address the criticisms of its systems. Concerns raised in 2013 by the US Congressional Appropriations Committee, which stated that it “remains concerned that foreign governments may fabricate criminal charges against opposition activists and, by abusing the use of INTERPOL red notices, seek their arrest in countries that have provided them asylum”,35 were a clear warning signal of the potential financial implications of its failure to strengthen its ability to prevent non-compliant INTERPOL alerts from being circulated. c) INTERPOL’s credibility 58. If its immunity is vital to INTERPOL’s financial survival, its credibility is vital to the effectiveness of its alert systems. For INTERPOL alerts to work as they should, it is imperative that INTERPOL’s members trust that the alerts are a valid basis upon which to take action to limit the rights of an individual within their jurisdiction. Fair Trials was not alone in shining a light on all the reasons why Member States should perhaps think twice about putting their faith in INTERPOL. ‘… the Working Group on the Processing of Information, or GTI, will help build a more robust system that will ensure compliance with international standards and consequently provide increased protection to the Organisation from litigation.’34 Jürgen Stock, Secretary General of INTERPOL Waite and Kennedy v. Germany (n 22) Kadi (n 22) 33 Paragraphs 322-325. 34 Stock (n 28) 35 US Congressional Appropriations Committee, Committee Reports, 113 th Congress (2013-14), H Rept No 113-171 31 32 25