CAT/C/71/D/802/2017 precisely who accessed their personal information as a result of the data breach. The assumption was sensible because the true extent of access to the personal information of each affected applicant must in practical terms have been unknowable. Once downloaded from the Department’s website, the document containing the personal information of the 9,258 visa applicants could have been forwarded to and interrogated by anyone, anywhere and at any time. Attempting to make a finding about precisely who had obtained access to the personal information of any one of them, and when, might be expected to have been a hopeless endeavour.7 The complainant maintains that the same reasoning applies in the present case. It is logical to presume that the Government of China possesses the unedited version of the publication of the Federal Court. It is not possible to claim that no damage was done. It is irrelevant that the Federal Court did not intend to cause harm. State party’s additional observations on admissibility and the merits 6. In its additional observations dated 2 April 2019, the State party maintains its position regarding the admissibility and merits of the communication. It submits that the media clips referred to by the complainant do not establish that she is a Falun Gong practitioner. Nor do they establish that she would practise Falun Gong upon her return to China, or that she would be of adverse interest to the Government of China. Although the complainant claims that the national authorities disregarded the active efforts by the Government of China to exile dissidents, this does not compromise the authorities’ findings regarding the complainant’s credibility. In addition, although the complainant claims that the national authorities did not consider the fact that she worked for a private company in China, and that private companies have greater freedom to employ dissidents, the Refugee Review Tribunal explicitly stated that the complainant worked for a private company, not a State-owned enterprise. Complainant’s additional comments on the State party’s additional observations 7.1 In her comments dated 5 April 2019, the complainant refers to the State party’s observation that her employment by a private rather than a publicly owned company was considered by the Refugee Review Tribunal. According to the complainant, what is relevant is that the Tribunal failed to consider the difference in employment practices between private and State-owned companies in China. 7.2 The complainant did not claim before the domestic authorities that her husband faced a risk of harm in China because at the relevant time, he was not a Falun Gong practitioner. Her failure to file an application for a protection visa for him only reflects her failure to understand all of the implications of applying for protection. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 8.1 Before considering any claim submitted in a communication, the Committee must decide whether it is admissible under article 22 of the Convention. The Committee has ascertained, as it is required to do under article 22 (5) (a) of the Convention, that the same matter has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 8.2 In accordance with article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, the Committee shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that the individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee notes that, in the present case, the State party has not contested that the complainant has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee therefore finds that it is not precluded by article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention from examining from the communication. 8.3 The Committee notes the State party’s position that the complainant’s claims relating to her risk of being subjected to harassment, detention and surveillance in China are inadmissible ratione materiae. The Committee notes the complainant’s response that her 7 8 High Court of Australia, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection et al. v. Szssj et al., 27 July 2016. GE.21-11876