CAT/C/71/D/802/2017 persecution in China would begin with harassment and surveillance, and would escalate to torture and death. The Committee considers that the complainant has not provided sufficient elements to allow it to conclude that either the level of harassment and surveillance, or the conditions of detention to which she risks being subjected would constitute torture within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention, so as to engage the State party’s non-refoulement obligations under article 3 of the Convention. The Committee therefore considers that this part of the communication is manifestly ill-founded, and is therefore inadmissible. 8.4 The Committee takes note of the State party’s position that the remainder of the communication is also inadmissible because it is manifestly ill-founded. Noting the detailed arguments advanced by the complainant to contest the specific findings of the national authorities concerning the credibility of her allegations, the Committee considers that for purposes of admissibility, the complainant has sufficiently substantiated her claim that she would be subjected to torture if she were removed to China. As the Committee finds no further obstacles to admissibility, it declares this part of the communication submitted under article 3 of the Convention admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 9.1 In accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, the Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties. 9.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the forced removal of the complainant to China would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that that person would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 9.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture upon return to China. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. 8 However, the Committee recalls that the aim of the determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. 9 It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.10 9.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, according to which the nonrefoulement obligation exists whenever there are “substantial grounds” for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in a State to which he or she is facing deportation, either as an individual or as a member of a group that may be at risk of being tortured in the State of destination. The Committee recalls that “substantial grounds” exist whenever the risk of torture is “foreseeable, personal, present and real”.11 Indications of personal risk may include, but are not limited to: (a) ethnic background and religious affiliation; (b) previous torture; (c) incommunicado detention or other form of arbitrary and illegal detention in the country of origin; and (d) political affiliation or political activities of the complainant.12 8 9 10 11 12 GE.21-11876 See, for example, X v. Switzerland (CAT/C/67/D/775/2016), para. 8.3. See, for example, E.T. v. Netherlands (CAT/C/65/D/801/2017), para. 7.3. Y.G. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/65/D/822/2017), para. 7.3. Committee against Torture, general comment No. 4 (2017), para. 11. Ibid., para. 45. 9