CEDAW/C/58/D/47/2012 services, fearing the abuser would harm the child as a form of mistreatment against her. However, the authorities took no effective measures of protection. 3.4 During the years in which the author was a victim of domestic violence, there existed in Spain a lack of protection and investigation of domestic violence by authorities and the judiciary. In a 2001 report, the General Council of the Judiciary criticized this situation and called attention to the neglect of victims and the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators. Although measures were adopted between 1993 and 2003, the inequality and discrimination against victims continued. The State’s inability to forge effective tools to combat domestic violence has led to situations such as the present case, which constitutes a violation of article 2 (a), (b) and (f). 3.5 The unresponsiveness of the administration and courts to the violence suffered by the author points to the persistence of prejudices and negative stereotypes, taking the form of an inadequate appreciation of the seriousness of her situation. That situation arose in a social context marked by a high incidence of domestic violence. The attitude of public authorities towards the author as a woman victim of violence and mother of a child murdered by her father, and towards her daughter as a child victim of intra-family violence, was inadequate. Accordingly, the action of the administration and courts constituted a violation of article 2 (d). 3.6 The courts never carried out an effective investigation to clarify responsibilities arising from the administrative and judicial negligence that culminated in the murder of Andrea. Moreover, the author has received no redress, which constitutes a violation of article 2 (b and c). 3.7 The State party failed to discharge its obligations under article 2, subparagraphs (a), (b) and (f) through the lack of a normative framework protecting women from domestic violence at the time when the events took place. Moreover, despite legislative reforms introduced since 2004, the legal framework still has not established a system of redress in cases of negligence by institutions and adequate protection of minors who live in an environment of violence and who are consequently also victims. The State’s duty of diligence requires the adoption of legal and other measures to protect victims effectively. 3.8 With regard to article 5 of the Convention, the author asserts that the existence of prejudices by the authorities showed itself in their inability to correctly gauge the gravity of the situation she and her daughter were facing and her suffering due to the situation of the child. Further, no inquiry was ever conducted into the consequences for the child of living in an atmosphere of violence and her condition as a direct and indirect victim of that violence. Instead, the authorities responsible for providing protection chose to follow the stereotypical view that even the most abusive should enjoy visitation rights and that it is always better for a child to be raised by its father and mother; thus failing to appreciate the rights of the child and disregarding the fact that she had expressed fear of her father and rejected the contact. The courts took it for granted that it is better to have contact even with a violent father. The circumstances of the case called for the authorities and courts to evaluate whether the visits respected the child’s right to life, to live free of violence, and the principle of the best interests of the child. 3.9 States have the obligation to protect children’s right to be heard. In the present case, the judicial decisions did not respect that right. Several reports from social services indicated that F.R.C. did not appreciate the age of the child and interacted inappropriately with her, but this point was not considered by the 14-59288 7