CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 virtue of the existing legislative framework, the State party subjected the author to conditions of intense physical and mental suffering. The author, as a pregnant woman in a highly vulnerable position after learning that her much-wanted pregnancy was not viable, and as documented, inter alia, in the psychological reports submitted to the Committee, had her physical and mental anguish exacerbated by not being able to continue receiving medical care and health insurance coverage for her treatment from the Irish health-care system; the need to choose between continuing her non-viable pregnancy or travelling to another country while carrying a dying fetus, at her personal expense and separated from the support of her family, and returning while not fully recovered; the shame and stigma associated with the criminalization of abortion of a fatally ill fetus; the fact of having to leave the baby’s remains behind and later having them unexpectedly delivered to her by courier; and the State party’s refusal to provide her with the necessary and appropriate postabortion and bereavement care. Many of the negative experiences described that she went through could have been avoided if the author had not been prohibited from terminating her pregnancy in the familiar environment of her own country and under the care of the health professionals whom she knew and trusted, and if she had been afforded the health benefits she needed that were available in Ireland, were enjoyed by others, and could have been enjoyed by her, had she continued her non-viable pregnancy to deliver a stillborn child in Ireland. 7.5 The Committee considers that the author’s suffering was further aggravated by the obstacles she faced in receiving the information she needed about her appropriate medical options from known and trusted medical providers. The Committee notes that the Abortion Information Act legally restricts the circumstances in which any individual may provide information about lawfully available abortion services in Ireland or overseas and criminalizes advocating or promoting the termination of pregnancy. The Committee further notes the author’s unrefuted statement that the health professionals did not deliver such information in her case and that she did not receive key medically indicated information about the applicable restrictions on overseas abortions and the most appropriate types of terminations, given her period of gestation, thereby disrupting the provision of medical care and advice that the author needed and exacerbating her distress. 7.6 The Committee additionally notes, as stated in paragraph 3 of its general comment No. 20, that the text of article 7 allows of no limitation and no justification or extenuating circumstances may be invoked to excuse a violation of article 7 for any reason. Accordingly, the Committee considers that, taken together, the above-mentioned facts amounted to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of article 7 of the Covenant. 7.7 The author claims that by denying her the only option that would have respected her physical and psychological integrity and reproductive autonomy under the circumstances of the case (allowing her to terminate her pregnancy in Ireland), the State interfered arbitrarily in her right to privacy under article 17 of the Covenant. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence to the effect that a woman’s decision to request termination of pregnancy is an issue which falls under the scope of this provision. 9 In the present case, the State party interfered with the author’s decision not to continue her non-viable pregnancy. The interference in this case was provided for under article 40.3.3 of the Constitution and therefore was not unlawful under the State party’s domestic law. However, the question before the Committee is whether such interference was unlawful or arbitrary under the Covenant. The State party argues that there was no arbitrariness, since the interference was 9 16 See K.L. v. Peru, para. 6.4, L.M.R. v. Argentina, Views adopted on 29 March 2011, para. 9.3. See also the Committee’s general comment No. 28 (2000) on the equality of rights between men and women, para. 10.