CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 proportionate to the legitimate aims of the Covenant, taking into account a carefully considered balance between protection of the fetus and the rights of the woman. 7.8 The Committee considers that the balance that the State party has chosen to strike between protection of the fetus and the rights of the woman in the present case cannot be justified. The Committee recalls its general comment No. 16 (1988) on the right to privacy, according to which the concept of arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that even interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances. The Committee notes that the author’s much-wanted pregnancy was not viable, that the options open to her were inevitably a source of intense suffering and that her travel abroad to terminate her pregnancy had significant negative consequences for her, as described above, that could have been avoided if she had been allowed to terminate her pregnancy in Ireland, resulting in harm contrary to article 7. On that basis, the Committee considers that the interference in the author’s decision as to how best cope with her nonviable pregnancy was unreasonable and arbitrary in violation of article 17 of the Covenant. 7.9 The author claims that criminalization of abortion on the grounds of fatal fetal impairment violated her rights to equality and non-discrimination under articles 2 (1), 3 and 26. The State party rejects this claim and contends that its legal regime regarding termination of pregnancy is not discriminatory. 7.10 The Committee notes that under the legal regime in the State party, women pregnant with a fetus with a fatal impairment, who nevertheless decide to carry the fetus to term continue to receive the full protection of the public health-care system. Their medical needs continue to be covered by health insurance and they continue to benefit from the care and advice of their public medical professionals throughout the pregnancy. After miscarriage or delivery of a stillborn child, they receive any post-natal medical attention and bereavement care they need. By contrast, women who choose to terminate a non-viable pregnancy must rely on their own financial resources to do so entirely outside the public health-care system. They are denied health insurance coverage for that purpose; they must travel abroad at their own expense to secure an abortion and incur the financial, psychological and physical burdens that such travel imposes; and they are denied post-termination medical care and bereavement counselling they need. The Committee further notes the author’s uncontested allegations that in order to secure a termination of her non-viable pregnancy, she was required to travel abroad, incurring financial costs that were difficult for her to raise. She also had to travel back to Dublin only 12 hours after the delivery, as she and her husband could no longer afford to stay in the United Kingdom. 7.11 In paragraph 13 of its general comment No. 28 (2000) on the equality of rights between men and women, the Committee states that: “not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant”. The Committee notes the author’s claim that the State party’s criminalization of abortion subjected her to a gender-based stereotype of the reproductive role of women primarily as mothers, and that stereotyping her as a reproductive instrument subjected her to discrimination. The Committee considers that the differential treatment to which the author was subjected in relation to other similarly situated women failed to adequately take into account her medical needs and socioeconomic circumstances and did not meet the requirements of reasonableness, objectivity and legitimacy of purpose. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that the failure of the State party to provide the author with the services that she required constituted discrimination and violated her rights under article 26 of the Covenant. 7.12 In the light of the above findings, the Committee will not examine separately the author’s allegations under articles 2 (1), 3 and 19 of the Covenant. 17