CCPR/C/129/D/2970/2017 4.2 The State party confirms the facts as described by the author, and adds that, in her asylum application, she stated that she did not file a complaint against her family with the police “because the authorities do not side with anyone against his or her family” and that she was unable to seek refuge in another part of her country because her family would have found her there. 4.3 The State party emphasizes that the aim of the author’s arguments is essentially to persuade the Committee to review and overturn the decisions of the Canadian courts. It recalls in this regard that the Committee is not a court of appeal.3 The State party emphasizes that all the claims made by the author in her communication have been subjected to rigorous scrutiny before multiple bodies and have been duly analysed by independent and impartial national bodies in accordance with Canadian law and the country’s international human rights obligations, with due regard for fairness. The State party describes how the author’s case proceeded through the national system of bodies set up to consider cases such as hers and points out that she was represented by counsel at every step of the way and able to lodge appeals in an attempt to substantiate her claims and the evidence she put forward. The State party submits that the author has not shown that the decisions of the Canadian authorities were flawed in such a way as to warrant an intervention by the Committee. 4.4 Referring to the claimed violation of article 2 of the Covenant, the State party recalls that article 2 does not confer an independent right to redress; it simply defines the scope of the legal obligations of States parties.4 It must therefore be invoked in conjunction with an article of the Covenant conferring a right on the author of a communication.5 Thus, claims relating to article 2 cannot of themselves form the basis of a claim in a communication submitted under the Optional Protocol. If, however, the Committee finds that the author’s claims can be examined in the light of article 2 of the Covenant taken in isolation, the State party submits that the author has failed to substantiate them, as there is no evidence that the risks she claims she would face have not been seriously assessed by the Canadian authorities. The State party explains that all the evidence was evaluated by experts, that each jurisdiction has its own rules and that if some evidence was rejected by the Canadian authorities, it was because it did not fall within the definition of new evidence under Canadian law. 4.5 The State party notes that the author did not explicitly claim that there had been a violation of article 24 (1) of the Covenant, which establishes the right of every child to be protected by his or her family, society and the State.6 Even if she had done so, however, these aspects of the communication would be inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol and rule 99 (d) of the Committee’s rules of procedure, since the claims formulated are incompatible ratione materiae with article 24 of the Covenant. In addition, since the author’s son is not subject to a deportation order, if he left Canada, it would be because his mother decided to take him to Mauritania. Furthermore, even if the Committee were of the view that the author’s son was subject to a measure taken by the State party, article 24 does not impose a non-refoulement obligation on the expelling State and this issue should be duly considered under articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. In this respect, the State party refers the Committee to its comments on these articles. 4.6 The State party submits that the author’s claims under articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant have not been substantiated sufficiently for the communication to be found admissible. The author’s claims are, in essence, the same as those that were examined and deemed unfounded by impartial and independent Canadian authorities. According to the State party, these claims contain a number of incongruities, such as the fact that the author travelled to the United States in March 2013 before returning to Mauritania, that she did not claim asylum in the United States, and that she has never sought protection in Mauritania or provided any evidence that she would not be protected if she were deported to Mauritania. Furthermore, 3 4 5 6 4 See, inter alia, Tarlue v. Canada (CCPR/C/95/D/1551/2007), para. 7.4; Kaur v. Canada (CCPR/C/94/D/1455/2006), para. 7.3; and Tadman and Prentice v. Canada (CCPR/C/93/D/1481/2006), para. 7.3. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 31 [2004]. Para. 3. See, inter alia, M.M. de Vos v. the Netherlands (CCPR/C/84/D/1192/2003), para. 6.3; and P.K. v. Canada (CCPR/C/89/D/1234/2003), para. 7.6. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 17 (1989), para. 1. GE.21-00740