CCPR/C/129/D/2970/2017 on 18 March 2017, at the Federal Court hearing, the author was questioned about the applications for visas to the United States that had been made on her behalf in September 2010 and August 2011. She claimed that she was unaware of them, explaining that she could read only Arabic. The State party is thus puzzled by her ability to organize her trip to the United States to join her husband there in June 2013. The Canadian authorities were also not persuaded of the author’s husband’s slave lineage, since, by her account, he was able to attend university and work in a government post in Mauritania, an unusual outcome for a descendant of slaves in that country. 4.7 The State party points out that the letters forming the basis of the author’s communication, with the exception of the letter from her husband, were studied by its authorities, who did not give much weight to them, as there was nothing to confirm the identity of the authors or to verify the veracity or origin of the letters and some information was incompatible with the author’s testimony. The State party recalls that it is not for the Committee to reassess the facts unless the evaluation of the facts and the evidence made by the domestic courts was clearly arbitrary or constituted a denial of justice. 7 In the present case, the author’s claims have been analysed fairly and in accordance with the law by the Canadian authorities, and her communication does not establish in any way that their decisions were in some way flawed. 4.8 Referring to the Committee’s jurisprudence, the State party submits that the author’s claims and evidence are too general to demonstrate that she would face a foreseeable, real and personal risk to her life or of being subjected to torture or other irreparable harm 8 if she were returned to Mauritania. Although reports confirm that there is cultural resistance to inter-caste marriage in Mauritania,9 Canada maintains that the author’s claims of potential violations of articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant are not sufficient to oblige it to respect the principle of non-refoulement in her case. 4.9 The State party submits that the situation of the author’s son has already been examined by its authorities. In addition to the arguments made above, the State party notes that, if Mauritania does not recognize dual citizenship, the author could renounce her son’s Canadian citizenship. Furthermore, the State party affirms that the author chose to settle in Canada of her own accord, knowing that she might have to leave with a child born in the country. The State party notes that, according to the author, the father of the child has been recognized as a refugee in the United States and that his application for asylum there included his wife and son. The State party, without taking a position on the immigration rules of the United States, also notes that the author has not submitted any evidence that the child could not live with his father. As for the author’s arguments that her son needs regular medical care, the State party points out that the deportation of a person to a country that cannot provide health care of equivalent quality to that in Canada does not entail an obligation of nonrefoulement unless the circumstances are exceptional, which is not the case here. 4.10 The State party requests the Committee, on a secondary basis, if it does find the communication admissible, to rule that it is without merit for the reasons set out above. Author’s comments on the State party’s observations 5.1 On 8 March 2019, the author commented on the State party’s observations. She reiterates her version of the facts and adds that she can no longer count on the possibility of resident or other status in the United States, since she and her husband divorced on 24 March 2018. She also adds that, on 14 May 2018, she filed a new application for permanent residence on humanitarian grounds. This application was refused, and the author was notified of the decision in December 2018. The author again applied for judicial review, and a review is currently under way, but the review does not entail a stay of the deportation order. The 7 8 9 GE.21-00740 Kibale v. Canada (CCPR/C/93/D/1562/2007), para. 6.4; Pham v. Canada (CCPR/C/93/D/1534/2006), para. 7.4; Tadman and Prentice v. Canada, para. 7.3; P.K. v. Canada, para. 7.3; Simms v. Jamaica (CCPR/C/53/D/541/1993), para. 6.2; and G.A. Van Meurs v. the Netherlands (CCPR/C/39/D/215/1986), para. 7.1. Wilfred v. Canada (CCPR/C/94/D/1638/2007), para. 4.3; and S.V. v. Canada (CCPR/C/105/D/1827/2008), para. 8.8. United States Department of State, Mauritania 2016 Human Rights Report, p. 21. 5