CCPR/C/117/D/2379/2014 to enter Italy and stay there lawfully. It therefore refused to grant asylum to the author with reference to section 7 (3) of the Act (the country of first asylum principle). The State party adds that, when considering whether a country may serve as a country of first asylum, the Board requires as a mandatory minimum that the asylum seeker is protected against refoulement. It must also be possible for the asylum seeker to enter legally and to get lawful residence in the country of first asylum involved, and the asylum seeker’s personal integrity and safety must be protected there. This concept of protection also includes a certain social and economic element since asylum seekers must be treated in accordance with basic human standards. 8 However, it cannot be required that the relevant asylum seekers will have completely the same social living standards as the country’s own nationals. The core of the protection concept is that the persons must enjoy personal safety both when they enter and when they stay in the country of first asylum. 4.6 As to the author’s allegations that, if returned to Italy, she and her four children would risk having to live on the streets without access to accommodation, food or sanitary facilities, the State party refers to the European Court of Human Rights decision on admissibility of 2 April 2013 in Samsam Mohammed Hussein and Others v. the Netherlands and Italy. That case concerned a female Somali national and her two minor children who had entered Italy in August 2008 and had been granted residence for the purpose of subsidiary protection in March 2009. In April 2009, she left the reception centre for asylum seekers in Italy and, in May 2009, applied for asylum in the Netherlands. The Netherlands refused asylum to the applicant in March 2010 with reference to Italy being responsible for the processing of her asylum application pursuant to the Dublin II Regulation. In her application to the European Court, the applicant submitted that, on account of her living conditions in Italy, she had been subjected to treatment contrary to article 3 of the European Convention and that, owing to the risk of similar treatment upon return, her transfer from the Netherlands to Italy would violate of her rights under the said provision. The Court found that the application had been manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible. In that regard, the State party observes that article 3 of the European Convention corresponds to article 7 of the Covenant. 4.7 The State party further notes that, concerning the treatment of asylum seekers in Italy, the Court noted that a person granted subsidiary protection would be provided with a residence permit with a validity of three years that can be renewed by the territorial commission that granted it. This permit can further be converted into a residence permit for the purposes of work in Italy, provided such a request is made before the expiry of the validity of the residence permit and provided the person concerned holds an identity document. A residence permit granted for subsidiary protection entitles the person concerned, inter alia, to a travel document for aliens, and allows the person to work, seek family reunification and benefit from the general schemes for social assistance, health care, social housing and education under Italian law. Furthermore, a person who has been granted a residence permit for compelling humanitarian reasons will be provided with a residence permit with a validity of one year that can be converted into a residence permit for the purposes of work in Italy, provided the person concerned holds a passport. A residence permit granted on humanitarian grounds entitles the person concerned to work, health care and, in case he or she has no passport, to a travel document for aliens.9 8 9 6 The State party notes that the assessment includes, inter alia, parts II-V of the 1951 Geneva Convention and conclusion No. 58 (XL) of the Executive Committee of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1989). See Samsam Mohammed Hussein and Others v. the Netherlands and Italy (note 3 above), paras. 38 and 39.